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Abstract  
  
A spatial price equilibrium (SPE) model of the world sugar market is programmed. The model covers 
more than hundred regions and contains sugar in as a sole product. It has a detailed coverage of 
policies and bilateral trade agreements. It is programmed as a mixed complementarity problem 
(MCP) in GAMS and uses the PATH solver. The SPE framework offers considerable advantages over 
other model approaches applied to the sugar market before. 
Four scenarios are simulated: A baseline scenario until 2015/16, accounting for implementation of the 
EU reform and market access commitments already decided upon. The liberalization scenarios 
include an implementation of the Falconer proposal for the current round of WTO negotiations, a full 
liberalization by the EU and a liberalization of all sugar policies world-wide. In the latter the world 
market price increases by around 30%. 
Results are discussed and related to special properties of the SPE approach. Strengths and 
weaknesses are identified and an outlook on the further refinement of the analysis is given. 
  
Key words: Sugar, Partial Equilibrium Model, Spatial Price Equilibrium Model, MCP.  
  
  
1. Introduction 
Sugar is one of the most highly protected agricultural products world-wide. Many industrial as well as 
many developing countries have high trade barriers and domestic market regulations in place 
(Mitchell, 2004). The Uruguay Round (UR) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) brought little 
changes to that situation. Trade barriers basically remained prohibitive where they had been so before, 
and domestic price levels were affected only slightly if at all. Policy changes which did have a major 
impact were introduced unilaterally, most important the Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative of the 
European Union (EU) and the reform of its common market organization for sugar (CMO). Recently, 
the EU announced that the sugar protocol with the ACP (Africa, Caribbean and Pacific) countries was 
cancelled and is to be replaced by a regulation similar to EBA for all ACP member states. In addition, 
the current round of WTO negotiations has the potential to impact the sugar market significantly. If 
the July proposal of Chairman Falconer is taken as a benchmark for a possible agreement (Agra-
Europe Weekly, 2007), the envisaged tariff cuts would bring an end to the prohibitive effect of the 
Most Favoured Nation (MFN) tariffs in all major distorting industrialized countries.  
 
Many of these policy changes have been analyzed with equilibrium models in recent years. These 
equilibrium models can be broadly divided in two categories, net-trade models and gross-trade 
models, the latter of which is able to account for bilateral trade flows endogenously. Bilateral trade 
relationships are prevalent and important in the sugar market. On the one hand, they are present as 
preferential tariff reductions as a form of development assistance, and in fact account for the bulk of 
the value of all agricultural trade preferences (Grethe, 2005). On the other hand, sugar is included in 
various regional trade arrangements which do not primarily serve development objectives. Net trade 
models analyzing the sugar market cannot explicitly take these trade relationships into account. The 
gross trade models applied to the sugar market in the past, however, all rely on the Armington (1969) 
assumption of heterogeneity with regard to origin. For the sugar, however, which “is a true 
homogeneous commodity” (Elobeid and Beghin, 2005), this assumption is unrealistic. It furthermore 
leads to the well known small shares problem (see e.g. Kuiper and Van Tongeren, 2006). In this paper 
a Spatial Price Equilibrium Model (SPE, Takayama and Judge, 1971) is applied, which allows for the 
combination of the strengths of both approaches: the depiction of bilateral trade flows and the 
retention of the homogeneous goods assumption. The model has a broad country and policy coverage, 
including a multitude of preferential and regional trade arrangements. It is formulated as a mixed 
complementarity problem (MCP) in GAMS and solved with the PATH solver. Chapter 2 describes the 
SPE model. In chapter 3, a baseline scenario and three liberalization scenarios are simulated and a 
sensitivity analysis with respect to crucial parameters is carried out. In chapter 4, results are discussed 
and related to special properties of the SPE approach. Strengths and weaknesses of the approach are 
identified and an outlook on the further refinement of the analysis is made.1  
 
 
2.  Description of the model 
 
The model used is this study is a SPE (Takayama and Judge, 1971). This model type in its original 
form is a normative model solved by maximizing a net-social-payoff function as suggested by 
Samuelson (1952). There are, however, situations which cannot be depicted properly in a SPE solved 
as a maximization problem, such as discriminatory ad valorem tariffs, which are present in most 
models including the one here. In such cases the SPE can be formulated as a MCP (Rutherford, 
1995).2 The MCP formulation of the model used here is: 
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with i being the set of consuming regions, j the set of producing regions,  Di demand in county i, Xsch,j,i 
trade flows from country j to i (including domestic sales) under scheme sch, PDi the consumer price, Sj 
supply in j, PSj the producer price, quotaj the production quota in j, PSHj the rental price for 
production quota, trqsch,j,i the TRQ for exports from j to i under scheme sch and PQsch,j,i the rental price 
for the TRQ. The parameters (written in lower case letters) in equation (5) are transportation costs 
from factory to the port, loading and unloading costs for ocean vessels, ocean freight rates, transaction 
costs, ad valorem and specific tariffs, export subsidies and transportation costs from the port or the 
factory to the wholesale market.  
 
                                                 
1 This paper is based in large parts on a Dissertation (Nolte, forthcoming) written at the Humboldt-University of 
Berlin under the supervision of Harald Grethe whose guidance is gratefully acknowledged. 
2 The explanation of this is rather complicated. It can be found in Rutherford (1995) or Bishop et al. (2001). 
Most of the national supply curves (as well as all demand curves) used in the model are isoelastic 
functions such as (6):  
εβ jj PSS *=  (6)
with ε being the own price elasticity of supply and β a calibrated intercept. To allow for the depiction 
of an end of production in certain countries, a different functional form (Nolte and Grethe, 2007) 
shown in (7) is applied for some countries, in which a (negative) parameter α is added to the function: 
( ){ }γβα jj PSMAXS *,0 +=  (7)
Stemming from a normative approach, the SPE model is unable to reproduce any arbitrary set of base 
data unless it constitutes an optimum. Thus, starting from the EU fob price (European Commission, 
2007), all other cif and fob prices as well as bilateral trade flows in the model are determined 
endogenously in a calibration run holding demand and supply constant. The outcome of this 
calibration run reproduces in most cases satisfactorily, though not perfectly, the trade patterns which 
can be observed in reality. 
 
The model covers 104 regions of production and 90 regions of consumption. These include the EU-25 
and accession candidates, the USA and all sugar producing countries which have and will have 
preferential market access to those countries under the various existing schemes. It furthermore 
contains Norway, Canada, Switzerland and all regions covered by the FAPRI/CARD International 
Sugar Model (Elobeid and Beghin, 2005). All sugar is modelled as white sugar equivalents (WSE). 
The production of sugar is modelled as a one-stage process and demand for sugar crops except for the 
production of sugar is not explicitly accounted for. The model covers all sugar policies listed by 
Elobeid and Beghin (2005) plus others extracted from various sources. As a spatial model, it is able to 
analyze the effect of bilateral trade policies. Thus, various preferential import schemes of the EU and 
the USA as well as regional trade arrangements such as CARICOM (Caribbean Community and 
Common Market), SADC (Southern African Development Community) and COMESA (Common 
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa) are modelled. Ocean freight rates are estimated 
econometrically for all routes from data published by the International Sugar Organization (ISO, 
2007). 3 
 
 
3.  Simulation results 
3.1. Scenario description 
 
The model described in the last chapter is used to simulate four scenarios for the projection year 
2015/16. These are: 
 
1. BASELINE SCENARIO: A benchmark scenario, which accounts for the implementation of all 
policy changes already decided. These are basically the phasing in of various preferential 
market access commitments by the EU (Accession of Bulgaria and Romania, EBA, duty and 
quota free access for ACP countries) and the USA (NAFTA, CAFTA). Shifters of technical 
                                                 
3 For a comprehensive overview over sources for base data and parameters and a more detailed description of the 
calibration process refer to Nolte (forthcoming).  
progress and demand are adjusted such as to meet quantity and world market price projections 
by FAPRI (2006).4 
 
2. WTO AGREEMENT: Simulation of tariff reductions according to the Falconer proposal of July 
2007 as shown in table 1.  
 
Table 1: Proposed Formula for Agricultural Tariff Cuts 
Industrialized countries Developing Countries 
Current tariff in ad 
valorem equivalents 
Tariff reduction Current tariff in ad valorem 
equivalents 
Tariff reduction 
0-20% 48-50% 0-30% 32-33%
20-50% 55-60% 30-80% 37-40%
50-75% 62-65% 80-130% 41-43%
> 75% 66-73% > 130% 44-49%
Source: Agra-Europe Weekly (2007). 
 
3. EU LIBERALIZATION: Complete liberalization of all EU sugar policies. All policy measures 
such as production quotas, tariffs, TRQs and export subsidies are abolished. The only policy 
measure which is retained is the decoupled direct payments.5 
 
4. FULL LIBERALIZATION: Full liberalization of all sugar market and domestic polices by all 
countries in the model. 
 
3.2. Results 
 
Table 2 shows the model results for prices (rows 1-14), production (rows 15-28) and consumption 
(rows 29-42) in major countries under different scenarios. As a world market price for white sugar the 
Near East cif price is chosen. Commonly the world market price for white sugar is stated as London 
fob. In a few years, there will, however, be no exports of sugar anymore from Europe. A European fob 
price is, thus, meaningless.6 In the baseline scenario this price is simulated to increase by 12% to € 254 
per ton. Prices in those countries which operate at world market conditions change by about the same 
percentage. Prices in the US, South Africa and Japan, which have administered prices in place, sink by 
20% due to inflation. The price in the EU decreases by even 44% due to the implementation of the 
2006 reform and the access for Least Developed countries (LDC) and ACP countries to the EU sugar 
market. The volume of the global sugar market (production equals consumption, stock changes are 
ignored) increases to 151 million tons. Production in single countries in table 2 increases by 10% - 
                                                 
4 The abolishment of the EU ACP sugar protocol was decided upon only after publication of the FAPRI data. 
The shifters were thus adjusted to meet the FAPRI projections under the assumed continuation of the protocol.  
5 The assumed allocation effectiveness of these direct payments, which is adopted from the ESIM model (BANSE 
ET AL., 2007), is 20%, which makes their effect on production rather unimportant. 
6 Another possibility would have been to take the Caribbean fob price as world market price, which is commonly 
used for raw sugar. Due to the complex economics of white and raw sugar production and shipping as well as 
refining (explained in detail in Nolte, forthcoming), this price would be much lower than the actual Caribbean 
price for white sugar (if it were traded) would be. 
33% except for the US, Japan and of course the EU, where the produced quantity even decreases due 
to the reform.7 
                                                 
7 Marketing allotments in the US are fixed according to FAPRI projections of US production. Japanese policy is 
assumed to keep the nominal internal price level constant. The reform in the EU is modeled by letting the least 
efficient producers subsequently reduce their production until a balanced market is achieved. This is somewhat 
in contrast to the most recent developments in the EU restructuring process.  
Table 2: Model results under different scenarios in 2015/16 (in MT WSE and real 2004/05 € per MT). 
 
 
Base* 
 
Baseline 
 
WTO 
Agreement 
EU 
Liberalization 
Full 
Liberalization 
 Prices     
(1) World† 228 254 (12%)‡ 273 (7%)# 302 (19%)# 333 (31%)#
(2) EU-27 712 396 (-44%) 380 (-4%) 307 (-22%) 339 (-14%)
(3) USA 518 414 (-20%) 349 (-16%) 414 (0%) 337 (-19%)
(4) Brazil 174 198 (14%) 217 (10%) 246 (24%) 277 (40%)
(5) Australia 190 215 (13%) 235 (9%) 256 (19%) 289 (34%)
(6) Thailand 221 240 (8%) 240 (0%) 258 (7%) 292 (22%)
(7) Guatemala 174 199 (15%) 220 (11%) 244 (22%) 279 (40%)
(8) Cuba 176 201 (15%) 222 (10%) 246 (22%) 282 (40%)
(9) Colombia 173 196 (14%) 218 (11%) 243 (24%) 278 (42%)
(10) South Africa 456 365 (-20%) 365 (0%) 366 (0%) 286 (-22%)
(11) Russia 358 362 (1%) 381 (5%) 409 (13%) 349 (-3%)
(12) China 292 323 (11%) 347 (7%) 370 (15%) 347 (8%)
(13) India 396 427 (8%) 427 (0%) 427 (0%) 354 (-17%)
(14) Japan 984 787 (-20%) 426 (-46%) 789 (0%) 342 (-57%)
 Production     
(15) World 132.4 151.1 (14%) 151.1 (-0%) 150.3 (-1%) 151.3 (0%)
(16) EU-27 19.1 15.7 (-18%) 15.3 (-3%) 5.3 (-66%) 9.6 (-39%)
(17) USA 6.9 7.1 (3%) 5.1 (-27%) 7.1 (0%) 4.6 (-34%)
(18) Brazil 25.4 31.7 (25%) 34.1 (7%) 37.5 (18%) 41.1 (29%)
(19) Australia 4.9 5.9 (21%) 6.3 (6%) 6.6 (12%) 7.2 (21%)
(20) Thailand 4.9 6.6 (33%) 6.8 (3%) 6.9 (6%) 7.2 (10%)
(21) Guatemala 1.8 2.0 (11%) 2.0 (4%) 2.1 (7%) 2.2 (12%)
(22) Cuba 1.5 1.7 (13%) 1.8 (2%) 1.8 (4%) 1.6 (-9%)
(23) Colombia 2.3 3.0 (28%) 3.1 (4%) 3.2 (8%) 3.3 (13%)
(24) South Africa 2.1 2.5 (21%) 2.6 (3%) 2.7 (7%) 2.8 (12%)
(25) Russia 2.2 2.4 (13%) 2.5 (4%) 2.6 (9%) 2.4 (-2%)
(26) China 8.9 10.0 (12%) 10.2 (2%) 10.4 (5%) 10.2 (2%)
(27) India 17.6 22.0 (25%) 22.0 (0%) 22.0 (0%) 20.7 (-6%)
(28) Japan 0.8 0.8 (-1%) 0.0 (-100%) 0.8 (1%) 0.0 (-100%)
 Demand     
(29) World 132.4 151.1 (14%) 151.1 (0%) 150.3 (-1%) 151.3 (0%)
(30) EU-27 18.0 19.6 (9%) 19.7 (0%) 20.1 (2%) 19.9 (1%)
(31) USA 8.5 8.8 (3%) 8.9 (1%) 8.8 (0%) 8.9 (1%)
(32) Brazil 9.8 11.3 (16%) 11.2 (-1%) 11.1 (-2%) 11.0 (-3%)
(33) Australia 1.1 1.2 (11%) 1.2 (-1%) 1.2 (-2%) 1.2 (-4%)
(34) Thailand 2.1 2.5 (20%) 2.5 (0%) 2.4 (-1%) 2.4 (-2%)
(35) Guatemala 0.6 0.7 (25%) 0.7 (-1%) 0.7 (-2%) 0.7 (-3%)
(36) Cuba 0.6 0.7 (7%) 0.7 (-1%) 0.7 (-2%) 0.7 (-3%)
(37) Colombia 1.4 1.8 (23%) 1.7 (-1%) 1.7 (-2%) 1.7 (-3%)
(38) South Africa 1.4 1.6 (14%) 1.6 (0%) 1.6 (-0%) 1.7 (2%)
(39) Russia 5.9 6.1 (3%) 6.1 (-0%) 6.0 (-1%) 6.1 (0%)
(40) China 10.5 11.9 (13%) 11.8 (-1%) 11.8 (-1%) 11.8 (-1%)
(41) India 18.2 22.0 (21%) 22.0 (0%) 22.0 (0%) 22.4 (2%)
(42) Japan 2.2 2.2 (3%) 2.4 (5%) 2.2 (-0%) 2.4 (7%)
Sources: F.O. Licht (2007a), European Commission (2007), Nolte (forthcoming); own simulations. * Base period 
is 2004/05. † Near East cif landed. ‡ Changes relative to the base period. # Changes relative to the 
baseline scenario 
 
After the implementation of a possible WTO agreement the world market price is supposed to increase 
by 7% to € 273. Production in countries with a formerly high degree of producer support decreases. 
The EU is only affected slightly due to the 2006 reform which anticipated many of the liberalizations 
which would otherwise have become due after the ratification of the WTO agreement. In the US, 
production decreases by 27% to 5.1 million tons. Both countries become significant importers of sugar 
on a MFN base. Production in Japan comes to a complete end.8 Production in countries currently 
operating at world market conditions increase by 3% - 9%, the strongest increase taking place in 
Brazil.  
 
In case of a unilateral abolishment of all sugar policies on the part of the EU, the world market price 
increases by 19% to € 302. Interestingly, this is more than the 7% which a partial liberalization by all 
WTO members would have brought about.9 This leads to according price increases in countries with 
an open sugar market, and to production increases are usually twice as high as those under the WTO 
scenario. The production in the EU on the other hand, where prices fall to world market level, 
decreases by more than two thirds to 5 million tons. Countries with an administered sugar price face 
no price change and thus no production increase.10  
 
The full liberalization of all sugar policies leads to a world market price increase of 31% to € 333. 
Results for single countries point in many cases in the same direction as those of the WTO scenario, 
but are more pronounced. For India and Russia, however, the results show the opposite trend. This is 
because their policies were not affected by the WTO scenario, since India’s bindings are high enough 
to sustain its current import policy after a WTO agreement and Russia is not a member of WTO. In 
case of full liberalization, their import policies are, however, affected as are those of all other 
countries.11 
 
Table 3 shows the sugar production of EU 27 member states under different scenarios. In the baseline 
scenario which provides for the implementation of the 2006 reform of the CMO, production falls to 
15.7 million tons. At an internal price of € 396, which is significantly above the new reference price 
level of € 323 (2004/05 real Euro), a balanced market is achieved with a consumption of 19.6 million 
tons and imports of 3.9 million tons. Despite still being allowed, subsidized exports do not take place 
anymore. Slovenia, Latvia and Ireland cease sugar production. Of those member states which continue 
to produce, all southern member states do not manage to fill their quota while all northern member 
states except for Finland as well as those which acceded in 2004 fill their quota. 
                                                 
8 Japan’s import regime is currently much more restrictive than indicated by its bound tariff and actually not in 
line with WTO rules. The WTO scenario simulates however, that only notified tariffs are further applied and of 
course reduced. 
9 It makes little sense to compare the world market price increases in a sense of the 19% resulting from EU 
liberalization being roughly 2.5 times the 7% resulting from a WTO agreement, because this strongly depends on 
the place of measurement. Measuring the world market price increases in the Caribbean as is usually done for 
raw sugar, the increases under both scenarios would have been 12% (WTO) and 22% (EU Liberalization) 
respectively. 
10 The exemption is South Africa, where domestic prices are administered, but the sugar sector operates basically 
at world market conditions. 
11 The decrease of production in Cuba is due to the abolishment of state control which is assumed to take place 
under liberalization.  
In the WTO scenario, the EU’s bound tariff for white sugar is cut by almost 70% which is assumed to 
be the final applied level. The tariff loses its prohibitive effect and MFN imports into the EU take 
place probably for the first time in the history of the CMO on a large scale. The internal EU price is 
dependent on the world market price and decreases by 4% to € 380. Total supply decreases by 3% to 
15.3 million tons. Demand is almost unaffected. No further member state ceases production. Eleven of 
them, however, reduce production among them two which used to fill their quota in the baseline 
scenario.  
  
 
Table 3: Sugar production in EU 27 member states in 2015/16 (thousand MT WSE). 
 Base Baseline WTO Agreement EU Liberalization Full Liberalization 
Austria 425.7 387.3† (-9%) 387.3 (0%) 134.3 (-65%) 247.7 (-36%)
BLEU 911.6 819.8 (-10%) 819.8 (0%) 213.7 (-74%) 480.1 (-41%)
Bulgaria 2.4 2.6 (8%) 2.4 (-8%) 1.6 (-38%) 1.9 (-27%)
Czech Rep. 523.7 454.9 (-13%) 454.9 (0%) 254.1 (-44%) 344.5 (-24%)
Denmark 487.6 420.7 (-14%) 352.3 (-16%) 16.7 (-96%) 150.2 (-64%)
Spain 1,001.9 581.9 (-42%) 479.2 (-18%) - (-100%) 195.2 (-66%)
Finland 146.9 89.7 (-39%) 78.6 (-12%) 25.2 (-72%) 44.8 (-50%)
France 4,187.0 4,032.5 (-4%) 4,032.5 (0%) 1,381.4 (-66%) 2,531.5 (-37%)
Germany 3,920.5 3,655.5 (-7%) 3,655.5 (0%) 1,157.9 (-68%) 2,285.2 (-37%)
Greece 309.0 88.2 (-71%) 53.4 (-39%) - (-100%) - (-100%)
Hungary 466.6 401.7 (-14%) 400.9 (-0%) 182.9 (-54%) 275.2 (-31%)
Ireland 209.3 - (-100%) -   -  -   
Italy 1,505.5 487.0 (-68%) 344.6 (-29%) - (-100%) - (-100%)
Lithuania 122.9 91.4 (-26%) 79.9 (-13%) 24.2 (-74%) 48.3 (-47%)
Latvia 66.9 - (-100%) -   -  -   
Netherlands 865.3 864.6 (-0%) 864.6 (0%) 294.0 (-66%) 513.0 (-41%)
Poland 1,890.9 1,671.9 (-12%) 1,671.9 (0%) 597.0 (-64%) 1,131.6 (-32%)
Portugal 72.4 27.6 (-62%) 20.1 (-27%) - (-100%) - (-100%)
Romania 40.7 38.2 (-6%) 35.1 (-8%) 20.9 (-45%) 26.2 (-31%)
Slovenia 43.0 - (-100%) -   -  -   
Slovakia 224.4 153.4 (-32%) 134.6 (-12%) 43.6 (-72%) 82.4 (-46%)
Sweden 399.1 325.7 (-18%) 325.7 (0%) 266.4 (-18%) 335.7 (3%)
UK 1,287.3 1,138.6 (-12%) 1,138.6 (0%) 697.5 (-39%) 947.5 (-17%)
Total 19,110.6 15,733.2 (-18%) 15,331.9 (-3%) 5,311.4 (-66%) 9,641.0 (-39%)
Demand 18,025.6 19,647.6 (9%) 19,722.3 (0%) 20,088.2 (2%) 19,917.1 (1%)
Imports 2,588.90 3,914.6 (51%) 4,390.1 (12%) 15,029 (284%) 10,779.6 (175%)
Exports 3,673.9 - (-100%) - - 251.9 - 503.3 -
Sources: F.O. Licht (2007a), European Commission (2007), Nolte (forthcoming); own simulations. † Bold 
numbers indicate that the member state fills its production quota. 
 
In case of full unilateral liberalization by the EU, the price sinks to the world market level of € 307. 
All southern member states cease production. None of the remainder fills its quota entirely anymore. 
Total production sinks by 66% to 5.3 million tons. Demand increases by 2% to 20.1 million tons. 
Interestingly, the EU becomes an exporter at world market conditions in this scenario. It exports 
roughly 250,000 tons to Switzerland where it has a large freight cost advantage over competing 
producers. 
 
In the full liberalization scenario, the EU price also falls to world market level, which is due to the 
dismantling of sugar policies of other countries with € 339 considerably higher than in the unilateral 
liberalization scenario. Demand increases compared to the baseline by 1%, supply falls by 39% to 9.6 
million tons. In the southern member states except for Spain production comes to an end. As in the 
unilateral liberalization scenario, no member state manages to fill its quota anymore, but reduction 
rates are of course much lower. The exports to Switzerland extend to the entire consumption level, 
since production there is ceased as well. 
 
Table 4 shows the results for imports of the EU under the different model scenarios. In the base 
period, Bulgaria and Romania are no members of the EU yet. They import about 700,000 tons of sugar 
on a MFN base from Brazil. Imports from ACP countries under the sugar protocol amount to 1.3 
million tons, under quotas for individual Balkans countries to 230,000 tons, under CXL quotas to 
89,000 tons under EBA to 104,000 tons and under SPS to 140,000 tons. In the baseline scenario, the 
internal EU price is projected to fall to € 396. Access for LDC and ACP is quota and duty free. CXL 
quotas for Brazil are extended considerably after accession of Romania and Bulgaria. Total imports 
increase from 2.6 to 3.9 million tons, all of which preferential. Especially the abolishment of the 
quantitative restrictions for LDC and ACP leads to high increases of imports. Especially Swaziland, 
the Dominican Republic, Guyana and Ethiopia expand their exports to the EU considerably. Other 
countries such as Sudan and Zambia which were expected to highly benefit from EBA market access 
increase their exports only moderately or even abandon them since their domestic and regional 
preferential markets offer higher revenues than exporting to the EU does. While all countries under 
CXL still fill their quotas, Serbia stops to deliver its quota of 225,000 tons due to the decreased price 
in the EU. For the same reason some ACP and LDC decrease their exports notwithstanding the 
increasing overall quantity of imports under these two schemes. Under the WTO scenario the EU 
wholesale price sinks to € 380. Whereas imports under CXL and the Balkans quotas remain 
unchanged, many ACP and LDC, e.g. Tanzania, Zambia or Madagascar, decrease their levels of 
exports or stop them. Others such as Guyana and Mozambique increase their imports despite the lower 
price level on the EU market due to erosion of preferences in other markets. Overall preferential 
imports decrease to 3.6 million tons. However, as already mentioned, the EU becomes an importer of 
sugar under MFN conditions. With roughly 800,000 coming in from Brazil, the entire quantity of 
imports increases to 4.4 million tons. Under the unilateral EU liberalization scenario no preferential 
imports take place anymore. Since production falls tremendously at an internal market price of € 307, 
the overall amount of imports increases to about 15 million tons. The largest part of these comes from 
Brazil with 12.7 million tons, the remainder coming from other Latin American countries and Eastern 
Europe (REU). One interesting result of that scenario which is, however, not displayed in table 4 is 
that the effect of preference erosion is rather moderate. Compared to the baseline scenario, no country 
reduces its production by more than 10%. The countries most affected are Swaziland, Barbados, 
Belize St. Kitts and Nevis and Guyana with a reduction of 9-10% each. Compared to the base period 
2004/05, only five ACP and LDC countries (Mauritius, Barbados, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis and 
Trinidad and Tobago) decrease their production at all, however, some of them by larger percentages (2 
– 20%).  Under full liberalization of all countries, the price and thus production decrease in the EU is 
less pronounced. Total imports, all of which are of course MFN imports amount to about 10.8 million 
tons. Brazil is again the major supplier and some 140,000 tons come from Eastern Europe. 
Table 4: Model results for imports of the EU 27 under different scenarios in 2015/16 (thousand MT WSE). 
  Base Baseline Doha EU Lib'n Full Lib'n   Base Baseline Doha EU Lib'n Full Lib'n 
Costa Rica  - - - 131.4 - Cuba  54.3 54.3 54.3 - - 
Cuba  - - - 376.4 - Brazil 22.0 508.1 508.1 - - 
Nicaragua  - - - 42.9 - Australia CXL 9.1 9.1 9.1 - - 
Brazil MFN 724.6 - 835.4 12,731.5 10,639.2 Other  3.7 3.7 3.7 - - 
Colombia  - - - 1,104.1 - CXL total  89.1 575.2 575.2 - - 
REU  - - - 597.7 140.4 Benin  3.8 - - - - 
RCA  - - - 45.0 - Burkina Faso  8.0 - - - - 
MFN total  724.6 - 835.4 15,029.0 10,779.6 Congo, D.R.  11.7 - - - - 
Congo, R.  10.2 - - - - Ethiopia  13.8 343.4 337.1 - - 
Côte d'Ivoire  10.2 131.5 - - - Guinea  - 26.7 - - - 
Kenya  10.0 - - - - Madagascar  - 18.3 - - - 
Madagascar†  10.8 - - - - Malawi  2.6 76.4 74.6 - - 
Malawi  20.8 - - - - Mozambique EBA 27.6 87.5 106.0 - - 
Mauritius  491.0 398.6 390.1 - - Senegal  - 93.8 - - - 
Mozambique  12.0 - - - - Sierra Leone  - 5.9 - - - 
Swaziland  118.2 580.3 589.2 - - Sudan  16.4 - - - - 
Tanzania  10.1 85.9 70.3 - - Tanzania  1.7 - - - - 
Zambia  14.4 - - - - Zambia  9.2 90.5 52.2 - - 
Zimbabwe  23.4 - - - - Bangladesh  0.3 - - - - 
RAF - 543.2 533.0 - - Nepal  9.0 - - - - 
Barbados ACP 32.3 10.1 9.5 - - EBA total  104.1 742.5 569.9 - - 
Belize  39.9 86.7 105.1 - - Congo, R.  1.7 - - - - 
Dominican Rep.  - 252.0 167.9 - - Côte d'Ivoire  10.0 - - - - 
Jamaica  118.6 - - - - Kenya  10.5 - - - - 
St. Kitts & Nevis  15.6 6.1 12.4 - - Madagascar  1.7 - - - - 
Trinidad & Tobago  29.7 - - - - Malawi  10.0 - - - - 
Guyana  155.0 280.9 297.8 - - Mauritius  13.8 - - - - 
India  9.9 - - - - Swaziland 30.0 - - - - 
Fiji  167.7 202.8 210.0 - - Tanzania SPS 1.7 - - - - 
Papua New Guinea  - 12.2 17.7 - - Zambia  11.9 - - - - 
ACP total  1,299.8 2,590.3 2,403.0 - - Zimbabwe  25.0 - - - - 
Albania  1.3 1.3 1.3 - - Belize  2.0 - - - - 
Serbia 225.0 - - - - Jamaica  6.4 - - - - 
REU Balkans 5.3 5.3 5.3 - - Guyana  8.0 - - - - 
Balkans total  231.6 6.6 6.6 - - Fiji  7.0 - - - - 
       SPS total  139.7 - - - - 
EU Wholesale Price  € 712 € 396 € 380 € 307 € 339 Total Imports of EU 2,589 3,915 4,390 15,029 10,780 
World Market Price (Near East) € 228 € 254 € 273 € 302 € 333 of which preferential 1,864 3,915 3,555 - - 
Sources: F.O. Licht (2007a), European Commission (2007), Nolte (forthcoming); own simulations. † ACP countries in bold letters are also LDCs. Their exports under the 
various scenarios are shown in the table under EBA. 
3.3. Sensitivity analysis 
 
The results of all equilibrium model studies depend crucially on assumptions and parameters for which 
the empirical foundation is often rather weak. The study at hand is no exemption from this rule. To 
investigate the extend to which results of policy changes might be over- or underestimated as a 
consequence of misspecification of parameters and assumptions, a series of sensitivity analysis is 
performed. The parameters which are regarded crucial are the supply elasticities of sugar and the 
ocean freight rates of sugar. Ocean freight rates have been estimated in by Nolte (forthcoming) as a 
function of among others the Baltic Dry Index which is calculated from freight rates on representative 
routes for bulk cargo. In the past years as well as in the base period of the model, the average BDI was 
about 4,000. This has also been assumed for the simulation performed in this chapter. In fall 2007, 
however, the BDI (which has always been rather volatile) increased to more than 10,000.12 In the same 
time the freight costs for one ton of (raw) sugar from Brazil to the Baltic Sea have increased to US$ 
93, whereas in the beginning of 2007 they had been US$ 45 (ISO, 2007). To investigate the influence 
of increased freight rates as well as changed elasticity values, the baseline scenario and the full 
liberalization scenario are calculated again under the assumption of 
 
1. a halving of all supply elasticities  
2. a doubling of all supply elasticities13  
3. a permanent increase of the BDI to 10,000. 
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Figure 1: Sensitivity analysis of the effect of full liberalization on wholesale prices for sugar compared 
to the baseline scenario with respect to various parameters. Source: Own simulations. 
                                                 
12 The upward trend has, however, stopped meanwhile, and the BDI is decreasing again since November 2007. 
13 Only the elasticities of isoelastic functions are altered in this sensitivity analysis. 
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Figure 2: Sensitivity analysis of the effect of full liberalization on sugar production compared to the 
baseline scenario with respect to various parameters. Source: Own simulations. 
 
In figures 1 and 2 the effect of the sensitivity analyses on the effects of full liberalization on prices and 
production in different regions compared to the baseline scenario are shown graphically. Halving all 
supply elasticities, full liberalization leads to a slightly stronger increase of the world market price. 
Thus, the prices in all regions surveyed in figure 1, all of which are in a liberalized world cif or fob 
based world market prices are somewhat higher. The effects on production are stronger. The increases 
and decreases projected with the halved elasticity set are usually less than half of those simulated with 
the standard elasticity set.  
The effects of doubling the supply elasticities are as can be expected exactly the opposite. The world 
market price increase is less pronounced than under the standard elasticity set, and thus all prices in 
the model are lower. Production changes as a result of liberalization are stronger pronounced than in 
the standard version.  
The effect of increasing the ocean freight rates on the results of liberalization is small compared to the 
changes of elasticity levels. Price and supply changes deviate barely from what is observed under the 
assumption of average ocean freight rates of the base period prevailing also in 2015/16. One must, 
however, have in mind that what is compared in figures 1 and 2 are relative changes, not absolute 
changes or absolute or relative levels of these variables. These are much stronger affected.14 
In summary, the results are more sensitive to changes of supply elasticities than to changes of freight 
rates. In no case, however, the sensitivity analyses lead to the direction of changes as a result of 
liberalization being turned.  
 
 
                                                 
14 See Nolte (forthcoming) for a more detailed sensitivity analysis. 
4. Conclusions and outlook 
 
The simulations carried out in this study provided a high number of interesting results. This applies to 
overall variables such as production, consumption and prices, as well as to particular results such as 
bilateral trade flows. Unfortunately, the scope of a conference paper does not allow for the discussion 
of all the numerous results which are produced by a model analysis with high country coverage and a 
gross trade formulation. Therefore, the focus of discussing results is put on the EU-27 market and the 
basic variables of the big players on the sugar market.  
Already the baseline scenario yielded interesting results for the medium term future of the world sugar 
market and the EU market in particular. The latter is projected to be in balance in 2015/16 with a 
production level of 15.7 million tons and imports of 3.9 million tons and at an internal price level 
which is well above the reference price of € 323 (real 2004/05). This is in contrast to the assumptions 
of the European Commission which regards it necessary to reduce the sugar quota from its current 
(2007/08) level of 16.6 million tons by 3.8 million tons to finally 12.8 million tons in order to achieve 
a balanced market. The preferential imports, especially from LDC are simulated to remain lower than 
expected.15  
The most interesting insight yielded by the WTO scenario is, that it is the level of the tariff which 
determines the future EU price level and thus production, rather than internal policies, i.e. the 
reference price. The EU starts to import some 800,000 tons under MFN conditions from Brazil. The 
overall amount of preferential imports decreases somewhat, with some suppliers decreasing, others 
increasing their supplies to the EU market. In the EU, prices, production and consumption are only 
affected marginally.  
A unilateral liberalization of the EU has, as can be expected the strongest consequences for the EU 
market and also impacts most other markets stronger than a WTO Agreement is simulated to do. The 
effect of erosion of trade preferences for sugar could be shown to have only moderate consequences, 
since many of the beneficiaries of preferences have access to other preferential markets or are even 
competitive exporters at world market price level. 
In case of full liberalization the model projects a world market price increase of 31%. This seems 
rather high. A comparable scenario simulated with the FAPRI/CARD International Sugar Model by 
Elobeid and Beghin (2005) leads, however, to an increase of 47% which is even higher, and the 
authors state that their result moves “within the ballpark of previous estimates obtained with partial 
equilibrium models”. One must, however, have in mind that the world market price Elobeid and 
Beghin refer to is a Caribbean fob price, whereas the world market price referred to here is a Near East 
cif price. The increase of the Caribbean fob price in this model would be 41% instead of 31% and is 
thus much closer to the simulation results of Elobeid and Beghin. Mitchell (2004) surveys various 
model-based studies which have been published a few years earlier than the ones reviewed here, and 
their projections of world market price effects of liberalization move around 40% as well. All these 
studies suffer, however, in comparability due to the fact that their reference scenario does not account 
for the implementation of the 2006 CMO reform by the EU. The effects of full liberalization of all 
sugar policies globally mitigate the effects of liberalization by the EU alone. Production decreases 
considerably less. The beneficiaries of liberalization in terms of market shares are as expected the 
currently competitive exporters Brazil, Australia, Guatemala, Colombia and South Africa.  
                                                 
15 The latter have been estimated by different model-based and not model-based sources to grow to about 2-3 
million tons (see Bureau et al., 2007; Nolte, forthcoming). 
 
The special ability of the model is the precise and realistic depiction of the development of bilateral 
trade flows in a changing political environment. In particular it is able to investigate how countries 
that have different opportunities for market access choose among these, which in turn influences the 
choice of other countries. Comparing the approach with the previously mentioned approaches of Net-
trade, homogeneous goods models on the one hand and gross-trade Armington-based models, the 
approach can clearly be seen as a progress towards a more realistic description of reality. In 
comparison to the Armington approach it suffers, however, one severe drawback, which is its inability, 
to reproduce any matrix of bilateral trade flows which is observed in the base period. This inability 
comes from the models quasi-normative nature. By using such a normative model, one implicitly 
assumes, that firstly, all constraints of all agents in the model are known and implemented correctly by 
the modeller and second, that all agents in the model possess all information, full rationality and their 
behave so as to optimise their utility. Both assumptions are wrong. One attempt to solve this problem 
for agricultural supply models was the development of Positive Mathematical Programming (PMP) by 
Howitt (1995) and others. A similar procedure could also be applied to calibrate a SPE to an observed 
matrix of trade flows. The approach, however, while solving one problem leaves open other questions 
such as how to treat trade flows which are zero in the base. It remains, thus, a challenge to find a 
solution for that problem. 
A normative or quasi-normative approach such as an SPE suffers particularly from a misspecification 
of real world constraints and relationships, since the worse they are represented, the further the model 
will deviate from the observed data, which is not the case for positive models. One characteristic of the 
sugar market which is currently accounted for on a simplified level in the SPE used in this study and 
which has a particular potential to improve the reproduction of the observed data is the distinction 
between raw and white sugar and to link both products by a refining industry. First of all, there is a 
number of countries which imports raw sugar to refine and re-export it on a large scale and these trade 
flows cannot be explained by the model in its current form. Furthermore, transportation costs and 
comparative advantages in the production are systematically different between raw and white sugar, 
which leads to trade flows not being explainable and prices for white sugar (since the model works 
with white sugar equivalents) being calculated wrong in some regions. 
A further possibility to refine the analysis does not relate to the SPE approach, but to the comparative-
static formulation of the model. Expectations about exports of certain LDC to the EU under EBA 
could not be met in the baseline scenario. For instance, Sudan and Ethiopia have ambitious plans for 
an expansion of their sugar sectors in order to benefit from EBA market access (F.O. Licht, 2007b). 
To account endogenously  for the investments that are being made in these countries in expectation of 
future marketing possibilities, the model would need a dynamic formulation of supply curves. 
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